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Abstract: Market booms are often followed by dramatic falls. To explain this requires an
asymmetry in the underlying shocks. A straightforward model of technological progress
generates asymmetries that are also the source of growth cycles. Assuming a
representative consumer, we show that the stock market generally rises, punctuated by
occasional dramatic falls. With high risk aversion, bad news causes dramatic increases in
prices. Bad news does not correspond to a contraction of existing production possibilities,
but to a slowdown in its expansion. This economy provides a model of endogenous
growth cycles in which recoveries and recessions are dictated by the adoption of
innovations.1
1. Introduction
Whenever there is a dramatic fall in the stock market public discussion centers on
the idea that investor psychology or irrationality is the root cause. Closely associated with
this view is the idea that stock market crashes (and the booms that precede them) are a
bad thing.  Even within professional circles, the fact that the stock market rises relatively
smoothly, but falls abruptly is used as evidence for this point of view. Indeed, to explain
the asymmetry in rises and falls, a fundamentalist view of the stock market requires an
asymmetry either in the underlying technology shocks that drive fundamentals or in the
information-processing mechanisms that characterize the market. The first source of
asymmetry has been recently studied by Zeira [18];  the second source of asymmetry has
been studied, for example, in a recent paper by Lee[9]. In this paper we consider the first
case, that is an asymmetry in the underlying process of technological improvement.
On the face of it, such an asymmetry seems implausible. Our goal is to argue, on
the contrary, that a very natural model of technological progress under uncertainty leads
to exactly the type of asymmetry required to explain gradual rises in the value of the
capital stock, punctuated by sharp declines, provided that traders are not terribly risk
averse. Indeed our contention is that this same model can explain both asymmetric growth
cycles with long recoveries and short and sharp recessions, and asymmetric movements of
stock market prices. This is accomplished without needing the unpalatable assumption of
technological regress. The evidence presented in Crafts [5], David [6], Hornstein and
Krusell [11], among others, suggests that large recessions may be triggered by
technological innovations and the adoption of new machinery.
Greenwood and Jovanavic [8] and [9] make a related point. They argue that when
a technology plays out the stock market declines. This may occur because incumbent firms
resist the introduction of the new technology, or it may be because of the need to train
labor as in Greenwood and Yorukoglu [10]. After a period of time, the new technology is
successfully introduced and the stock market rebounds. They focus on the IT revolution as
a case study of the replacement of one technology (main frame computers) by another
(PCs). Unlike our argument, however, the market does not recover gradually, but rather
suddenly, as the new technology comes on line all at once. The idea that a switch-over
between the old and new technology leads to an economic slowdown, can be found in2
many other places, Atkeson and Kehoe [2] is one example. Another is Zeira [18], which is
closely connected in spirit and basic intuition to this paper. Like us, Zeira stresses the role
played by the arrival of information on stock market movements and the intrinsic
asymmetry between the “good news,” corresponding to a continuation of the growth
process, and the “bad news” corresponding to a sudden halt of the growth process. Zeira,
however, concentrates on the learning process induced by the arrival of new information
while we focus on the endogenous growth and technological innovation side of the
problem.
We should also note that we study a one input (capital) model of production, as
for example, in Lucas [14] or Mehra and Prescott [16]. As a result, our model does not
address the controversial issue of correlations between labor inputs and technology
shocks, discussed, for example, in Gali [7].
Our basic model is that of an economy growing due to improving technology
introduced in Boldrin and Levine [4]. In this model, activity analysis is used to model the
existing state of knowledge as a set of currently available activities. This set of available
activities grows over time due to technological progress. In general, to make use of new
activities, it is necessary to introduce new kinds of capital. In this setting, it is natural to
distinguish between research and development - the process of introducing new
technologies and the process of improving old ones. We model this by assuming that there
are many types of capital, each one corresponding to a different underlying technology. In
addition, each technology (type of capital) is available in many generations. The most
rapid form of technological improvement is to upgrade existing capital to a newer
generation. Treating research as “extensive” and development as “intensive”, Jovanovic
and Rob [12], have derived exactly this result in a fairly general micro-model of
endogenous technological process. This distinction is also consistent with evidence from
the applied industrial organization literature. This literature suggests that new technologies
require a long time to be adopted on a large scale, and go through prolonged periods of
productivity enhancement before improvement opportunities die out. See for example,
Mansfield [15].
In our model each type of capital (technology) is limited in how many generations
of improvement can be sustained: no matter how much effort we put into it, an improved3
bicycle never turns into an automobile. Nevertheless the stage of improvement at which a
capital stock is played out and can be improved no further is not known in advance. When
a technology is played out, however, it is possible to introduce a new type of capital, but
there is necessarily a time delay before the new capital can compete on equal terms with
the old type of capital.
We study an activity analysis economy with constant returns to scale and zero
profits. At each moment of time, capital is a fixed factor, and is priced according to the
expected discounted value of future rents, which are in the form of consumption produced
directly or indirectly from that capital. In equilibrium, this price, computed from marginal
rates of transformation is equal to the price computed from marginal rates of substitution,
such as those used in Lucas [14].
In this economy the basic technology shock is the discovery that an existing type
of capital is played out. What impact does this have on the value of the existing capital
stock? The playing out of an existing type of capital does not reduce the currently
available activities or capital in any way, but it does make future production possibilities
less attractive than they would have been if the technology had not played out. The impact
this has on the market value of the capital stock depends (in our case of CES preferences)
on the coefficient of relative risk aversion. If the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
positive then the value of capital increases; if it is negative it decreases. This is due to the
combined impact of the bad news on future interest rates and on future consumption
flows.  In the highly risk averse case, interest rates drop sufficiently that even though the
value of future consumption to which current capital is a claim goes down, the present
value actually goes up. This, maybe surprising, feature of asset prices is not special to our
model. It applies to all consumption-based asset pricing models which adopt a time-
separable, CES utility function to value uncertain consumption streams. For example in
simulations with the Mehra-Prescott [16] model, we find that with the coefficient of
relative risk aversion greater than one, feeding observed consumption shocks into the
model results in stock price movements of an empirically relevant magnitude but the
wrong sign. This underlying mechanism also means that when consumption growth shocks
are positively correlated, the risky asset is a good hedge against risk, so that with high risk4
aversion the risk premium is actually negative. This was first pointed out in Boldrin,
Christiano and Fisher [3].
Given our specification for preferences, the case of low risk aversion is therefore
the empirically interesting one, because it corresponds to the stock market dropping on
bad news. We explore in some detail the time path of capital, consumption and prices in
the case in which technology shocks are relatively infrequent. Ordinarily there is no bad
news, and the value of capital gradually increases over time due to the overall growth in
consumption. This is the period of stock market booms. However, following a bad shock,
the value of capital falls abruptly. At this time, a new type of capital is introduced and used
to produce additional generations of the new type of capital, until eventually they are
sufficiently productive to be used in the production of consumption. At this time, the old
type of capital is retired, and the economy resumes its previous growth.
Of particular interest is the transition. Although this period corresponds to one of
technological innovation in the sense that a new kind of capital is being produced for the
first time, it is also a recession. In particular during the transition following the negative
shock, consumption and GNP may rise or decline, but they rise less rapidly than in good
times. During the recession, net investment stalls and a replacement process from old to
new machines takes place. The stock of capital grows at the same slow rate that
consumption does. During this recession, the stock market gradually recovers from its
initial fall.
We also examine the quantitative implications of the theory, showing that in a
realistic range of parameter values, it is possible to generate falls in the stock market on
the order of 10-20%, together with plausible business cycles.
Key to this point of view is the idea that neither the stock market boom, the stock
market crash, nor the recession that follows the crash are bad. Here they are part of a first
best solution to the problem of maximizing the present value of utility from consumption.
Of course, the negative shock is a bad thing in the sense it would be better if it were
possible for technology to continue improving. However, there is nothing in the working
of the stock market or in the behavior of consumption after the crash that could be
improved upon.5
At the heart of our results is the underlying idea that technology shocks are
properly thought of as asymmetric. Take, for example, “Moore’s Law,” the “law” that
says that the speed of microprocessors doubles every 18 months. From basic physical
principles, we are confident that this improvement will not continue forever. However, it is
difficult to predict with certainty when it will come to a stop. The discovery that Moore’s
law no longer holds, when it happens, may occur quite abruptly. Consider on the other
hand, the discovery of a new technology, however, abrupt: there is necessarily a delay
while the new capital is built, the new technology deployed, and the practical experience
(development) needed to use it effectively takes place. It is this basic asymmetry that we
capture here. This asymmetry is especially important when we consider technological
change in a broader perspective. For, at the aggregate level, technology is not merely the
knowledge of how to build things. It is also the institutions and arrangements for trade,
and capital includes the knowledge of how best to make use of those institutions. So, for
example, in a developing country, changes in legal arrangements such as trade policy or
improvements in financial markets can be viewed as the introduction of a new technology.
However, it takes some time for producers and traders to learn how best to make use of
these new institutions. In our model this corresponds to upgrading the current type of
capital. However, the benefits, for example, of trade liberalization, are not unlimited; in
our model, it is the discovery that benefits of liberalization have been exhausted that
triggers a recession and a fall in the stock market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section looks at the
behavior of the S&P 500 index over the century and concludes that the empirical evidence
rejects the hypothesis that stock market movements are driven by a symmetric Markov
process. Section 3 introduces our formal model and shows its equilibria are efficient.
Section 4 characterizes the dynamic properties of such equilibria showing, in particular,
the differential impact on the value of the capital stock of bad and good news. We present
both qualitative and quantitative evidence of this fact by simulating the growth cycles
generated by the model. Section 5 concludes.
2. Is There An Asymmetry Between Rises and Falls?
The first issue is whether there is evidence of the conventional wisdom of
asymmetry in rises and falls of the stock market. The purpose of the simple data analysis6
we are going to present next, is not to test our model, although detailed testing would be
valuable in future work, but rather to show that asymmetry is potentially a real puzzle that
needs to be explained. We should point out that our explanation of asymmetric shocks or
responses to shocks is not the only one -- see for example Zeira [18] and Lee [13] for
interesting models of how informational dynamics can lead to stock market overshooting
and corresponding asymmetries.
In the Appendix, we reproduce from Shiller [17] the real Standard and Poor’s
Index annually from 1889-1984.  We also calculate the logarithmic differences from one
year to the next as a deviation from the mean. The mean logarithmic growth rate during
the period was 1.0%.
The “common wisdom” we wish to verify is that increases are smaller and more
persistent than decreases. In the table below we compute the length of runs of deviations
above (+) and below (-) the mean growth.
This provides some preliminary evidence of asymmetry: runs of positive deviations
are longer than those with negative deviations, and there are more positive than negative
deviations. The fact that there are more positive than negative deviations is also reflected
in the fact that positive deviations are on average smaller than negative deviations: the
average positive deviation is 12.3%, while the average negative deviation is -16.0%. This








If shocks to growth are symmetric around the mean and i.i.d., how likely is it that
these differences are due to sampling error?  A simple test is to fit a two state Markov
model in which the probability of the next sign depends on the previous sign. The
maximum likelihood estimates are derived by computing the frequency of + separately,
conditional on the previous sign.  If the previous sign was +, the probability of another + is
53%; if the previous sign was -, the probability of a + is 61%. We can also compute
standard errors for each of these coefficients, subtract 50% and normalize; conditional on
+ the normalized value is 41%, conditional on - the normalized value is 141%. The
probability that the first value is 41% or more (using the normal approximation to the
binomial) is 34%; the probability that the second value is 141% or more is 8%. Since the
two values are independent of one another under the i.i.d. assumption, the probability that
both events occur is just the product of the two probabilities: 2.7%. So if the data is truly
symmetric and i.i.d. there is only a 2.7% chance of the observed discrepancy.
3. The Model
3.1. The State Space
We use a standard infinite horizon event tree model of time and uncertainty. Dates
are denoted by t = 012 ,,, K. At each date t there are possible a countable number of states
ht I ‡ . A state history  s t = (,,,) hh h 01 K  is a finite history of states. The (countable) set
of all state histories is denoted by S. For a given state history s t = (,,,) hh h 01 K  we let
ts t ()=  denote the terminal time and ht  the terminal state. We also order state histories
so that ~ ss ￿  if ts ts (~)( ) ￿  and ~ hh tt =  for t ￿ ts () .  We write s-1 for the immediate
predecessor of s and s
+ for the set of immediate followers of s. We let p s denote the




There is a single representative household, who following the state history s
consumes  cs ‡§+ .  This household receives total lifetime utility of  dp
ts
s sS s uc
() () ‡ ˚ ,
where 01 £< d  is a subjective discount factor. Rather more strongly, we will assume that
the period utility function is smooth, concave, bounded below, and, at least for levels of
consumption above a subsistence level cc ￿ , has the CES (or constant relative risk8
aversion) form uc c () (/ ) =-
- 1 q
q  where q +³ 1 0 is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. Note that for q ￿ 0 the CES function is not bounded below, which is why we
require this functional form only for levels of consumption above subsistence. As we are
interested in the theory of growth, not the theory of subsistence, the behavior of u for
small quantities of consumption is not terribly interesting.  In particular, in the equilibria
we consider, consumption will be uniformly bounded away from zero, and we will assume
that this bound exceeds the subsistence level. This means that we can assume that utility is
bounded below, which is technically useful, while never the less having the convenience of
the CES functional form.
3.3. Production Possibilities
There are a countable number of types of capital w = 01 ,, K. Each type of capital
is potentially available in a countable number of generations i =- KK ,, 0 1 , 1 .  We denote
by k
i w  the amount of type w  capital of generation i. We refer to a type/generation pair as
a kind of capital. Production takes place through linear activities, using capital as input.
We begin by describing all potential activities, although not all of these activities are
available at any moment of time, and indeed, some activities may never be available.
Each activity takes as input one unit of capital of a specific kind and produces a
single output in the following period. Type w  capital of generation i may be used as the
input into 4 distinct activities, each of which is characterized by the output obtained:
1) g
iunits of the consumption characteristic, g >1
2) b >1 units of the same kind of capital: type w  capital of generation i
3)  rb r : >> 1  units of the next generation of capital: type w  capital of generation i +1
4) 1 unit of type w +1 capital of generation iL - ,  L > 0.
We assume that grb > , so that more consumption can be obtained by moving to the next
generation of capital than by remaining with the current generation. Notice that we do not
presume that the increased consumption from higher generations of capital takes place
through the physical production of increased units of some commodity. The increased
amount of characteristic may take place through the production of more advanced9
commodities which contain more of the characteristic that is actually consumed. However,
to keep notation to a minimum, we will not explicitly introduce the distinction between the
amount of commodities produced and purchased and the amount of characteristic
consumed.
At each moment of time, only a finite number of this countable collection of
activities is actually available.  The set of available activities is determined by the state,
which we take to be a list of those activities that are available. We now describe both the
set of possible states, and the state transition process that determines p s the probabilities
of state histories.
A state h ‡I  consists of a latest type of capital w h () , and for each type of capital
ww h ￿ ()  a latest generation of capital i(,) wh, plus a number 0￿ m() h  (this number is
used to track the time since the latest type of capital was introduced). The available
activities are these: if ww h w h ££ () , (,) ii  then all four activities making use of k
i w  are
available, with the following exceptions:
1) if w w h w h <= () , (,) ii  then activity 3 producing the next generation of capital is not
available
2) if w w h w h =£ () , (,) ii  then activity 4 producing the next type of capital is not
available.
On the other hand, if ww h > ()  or ii > (,) w h  then no activities making use of k
i w  are
possible.
The interpretation of the state is this: except for the latest type of capital,
improvements on other types of capital have stalled, and it is no longer possible to
produce new generations. New types of capital can be introduced, from the very latest
type of capital and its latest generation, only when the opportunity of producing new
generations of the latest type of capital has vanished. The latter assumption deserves some
comment. It amounts to saying that experimentation with future technologies cannot take
place while the current technology is being used and improved. If this were not the case, a
benevolent planner could take advantage of the constant returns to scale nature of our
activities and run the technology w +1 at an infinitesimal scale to acquire valuable
information about the generation at which it will play out. This information is valuable10
because it eliminates the uncertainty about future consumption growth rates. As a result, it
also modifies the current market evaluation of the existing stock of capital, and makes
stock market prices a monotone deterministic process. This assumption is therefore
needed to retain a minimum of uncertainty about future technological evolution.
The states follow a Markov process. Fix an initial state h . We define the next
generation of capital as the state hg  in which w hw h () ( ) g = ,  ii g (, ) (,) wh wh =  for
w w h < () , ii g (() , ) (() ,) wh h wh h =+ 1, and  mm g () ( ) h h = +1. We define the next type of
capital as the state hb  in which wh wh () ( ) b = +1,  ii b (, ) (,) wh wh =  for w w h < () ,
ii b (() , ) (() ,) wh h wh h =+ 1, ii L bb (( ) , ) (() ,) wh h wh h =- - 1, and  m b () h = 0 . Starting at
h  only hh gb ,  can be reached with positive probability. If mM () h ￿  then, with
probability 1, hg  is reached. On the other hand, if mM () h >  with probability 1-p  the
state moves to hg  and with probability p  the state moves to hb . This means that for M
periods following a transition from state h  to state hb  there is no uncertainty about the
ability to build new generations of the new type of capital. Since we view p  as relatively
small, this assumption does have much economic import. However, by carefully choosing
M we can greatly simplify computations as we indicate below.
We will frequently refer to that transition from h  to hb  as a negative or bad
shock to technology. Similarly, we will call hb , which is characterized by  m b () h = 0 , the
negative or bad state. But notice that the technological possibilities at hb  are a strict
superset of those available at h . All activities that were available at h  are still available at
hb . In particular, we do not assume that a negative shock simply causes the current
capital stock to retrogress or become less productive. Indeed, it may be wondered why it
would ever be desirable to switch to a new kind of capital, which is, after all, essentially
identical to the current kind of capital. The answer is that despite the fact that the new
kind of capital is actually inferior to the old kind of capital, development of new
generations of the old kind of capital is impossible.  Switching to the new kind of capital
makes it at least possible to introduce higher generations of capital.
3.4. Production Plans
At any moment of time there are in principle a countable number of different types
of capital. Let kX s ‡  be the vector of different kinds of capital when the state history is s.11
The components of ks are ks
i w . An activity may be thought of as a triple (,,) x yc where
x yX , ‡  are the capital inputs in period t and output in period t +1, and c‡§+  is the
amount of characteristic output in period t +1. Let A be the set of all potential activities,
and recall that h  are those actually available when the state is h .  An activity vector l s  is
a map l s A : ￿§ +. Feasible activities are given by sets A A s Í , with A0 ¹Æ and for
~ ss ³  that A A s s ~ Ê . A production plan consists of a map from state histories S to capital
vectors  ks, consumption of characteristics cs (for ts () > 0) and activity levels lss A Î .
We say that the production plan is feasible with respect to the initial condition k00 ,h  if for





































We call an activity a viable for the state history s and initial condition k0 if there exists a
socially feasible production plan such that l s a () > 0. We denote the set of viable activities
at for state history s by  Ak s(,) 00 h . We assume that the initial set of activities A k 00 0 (, ) h  is
non-empty for k0 0 ¹ , and that for ~ ss ³  that A k A k s s ~(, ) (, ) 00 00 h h Ê . Note that  Ak s(,) 00 h
may be a proper subset of the set of feasible activities in hs. Similarly, we call a kind of
capital viable for the state history s and initial condition k00 ,h  if there exists a socially
feasible production plan such that there is a positive amount of it available at s. Finally, we
say that a production plan solves the social planner problem for initial conditions k00 ,h  if
they solve m a x ( () () )
() dlp h
ts
s a sS s ua c a
s - Î Î å å 1  subject to social feasibility.
3.5. Prices
Let qs be the present value price of different kinds of capital when the state history
is  s, and let  ps be the corresponding present value price of the characteristic.  In a
competitive equilibrium, these prices should satisfy two conditions: they should yield zero
profits and support the preferences.  Specifically, we say that prices yield non-negative
profits for the initial condition k00 ,h  if
pca qya qxa a A k s s s s ss s h () () () , ( , ) , + -￿ " ‡ "
‡
+ ˚ 0 00 ,12
and if this holds with equality, we say that the activity  a  yields zero-profits.  We say that




s sS s uc Î å  subject to
pc pc ss sS ss sS ‡‡ ˚ ˚ ￿ $ .
The first order conditions for the consumer are satisfied if
$> m 0 pu c s
ts
ss ³ md p
() ’( ) with equality unless cs = 0.
Here m is the marginal utility of consumption. Note that this first order condition is valid
for all values of cs > 0, but that for cc s <  the period utility function u does not have the
CES form, as we discussed above. The first order condition is most useful in the case of



















Finally, we say that prices and capital ks satisfy the transversality condition if
lim |( ) Ts s st s Tq k ®¥ = å = 0
3.6. Efficiency
We show how to characterize the solution to the planner’s problem by a relatively
standard price decentralization scheme, despite the fact that there are infinitely many kinds
of capital, and those actually available grow over time.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose that  $ , $ , $ l sss kc  are socially feasible for the initial condition
k00 ,h  and that  dp
ts
ss sS uc
()($ ) <¥ Î å . Then the following three conditions are equivalent
(0)  $ , $ , $ l sss kc  solve the social planner problem for initial condition k00 ,h
(1) there exist prices  $, $ qp  that satisfy the non-negative profit condition, yielding zero
profits for all activities for which  $ () l s a > 0 and support the consumption plan  $ cs with
$$ pc ss sS ‡ ˚ < ￿13
 (2) there exist prices  $, $ qp  that satisfy the non-negative profit condition, yielding zero
profits for all activities for which  $ () l s a > 0, the first order conditions and the
transversality condition.
Proof: First we observe that if the profit conditions holds then the transversality condition
is equivalent to the consumption plan having finite value. Indeed, from the zero profit
condition
qk qk q k qk pc s st s T ss s s s st s t t
T
ss st s t t
T
00 1 11 1 01 0
$$ $ $ $
|( ) |( ) |( ) -= - = =+ -- =+ == + = åå åå å .
Next we consider the T-truncated utility economy with utility function
dp
ts
s st s T ss s st s T uc qk
()
|( ) |( ) () £= + åå + 1 .
We observe that eliminating states with zero probability and non-viable kinds of capital,
this is an ordinary finite economy. By standard methods, a production plan  $ , $ , $ l sss kc
solves the social planner problem, if and only if its truncations solve this truncated
problem. The equivalence of (1) and (2) to zero now follow immediately from the
corresponding facts for the finite horizon case.
ª
4. Analysis of the Model
Let us begin by defining the most advanced kind of capital in state h  to be capital
of type w h ()  and generation i(() ,) w h h  if m() h >0, and capital of type w h () -1 and
generation i(() ,) w h h -1  if m() h = 0.  Fix the initial condition h0 . We will now analyze
the model under three assumptions: first, that the parameters rgd ,, satisfy the hypothesis
of Proposition 3.1 so that an optimum exists. Second, that M is relatively large compared
to L. Third, that the initial stock of capital consists solely of the most advanced kind of
capital in state h 0 .
4.1. Basic Results
It will be helpful to begin with a very simple problem: suppose that capital of a
particular type is stalled. More specifically, suppose that there single unit of generation 0
capital of this particular type, so that we are contemplating producing some output of the14
characteristic  t >1 periods from now using one of two methods. First, we can simply
build more of the existing type and generation of capital until period t -1, yielding b
t-1
units of characteristic.   Second, we can build a unit of the next type of capital of
generation -L , then use that to build generation - + L 1 and so forth until period t -1.
This yields  rg












and make the generic assumption that this is not an integer, then for tm < * we would
prefer to use the old kind of capital, while for tm > * we would like to use the new kind
of capital.
Proposition 4.1: If  Mm > - *1  and the initial stock of capital consists solely of the most
advanced kind of capital in state h0 , then with probability 1 in every subsequent state h
there will be a positive amount of the most advanced kind of capital available.
Moreover, there will be a positive amount of at most one other kind of capital, and this
will be of the type immediately preceding the most advanced kind. Moreover, the negative
state m() h = 0 can occur only when there is a single type of capital.
Remark: As we shall see below, the equilibrium switches between using a single type of
capital to produce consumption and new capital, then, when that kind of capital is played
out, the older kind of capital is used to produce the consumption good and reproduce
itself, while the new kind of capital is used solely to produce new generations of itself.
Finally, when sufficiently advanced new generations of the new kind of capital are
produced, the old kind of capital is abandoned completely, and the cycle begins anew. Of
particular interest is the transition when two kinds of capital are in use. We explicitly solve
for prices, output and so forth below. However, we should give the intuitive idea of what
happens during the transition.
During the transition, the new kind of capital is relatively unproductive at
producing current consumption. However, it is quite productive at producing (indirectly)
consumption a number of periods in the future. At equilibrium prices, firms are indifferent
between using activities involving either producing consumption from the old kind of
capital, or activities producing new generations of the new kind of capital. The price at15
which those new generations can be sold reflects the fact that ultimately they will be used
to produce consumption goods. If we think of the new generation of capital as being
retained within the firm rather than sold in the market, the firm producing the new
generations of capital will have negative cash flow. Since the new kind of capital is not
being used to produce consumption, the activity of producing new generations can be
viewed as development – learning to produce more advanced generations of capital. The
output from this D part of R&D is more advanced capital, which is either sold or retained
within the firm. The activities of Internet startup firms, which have high capitalized value,
yet have negative cash flow, can be interpreted as engaging in this development activity;
IPOs correspond to selling the relatively advanced generation of capital that has been
produced over a number of years within the firm.
Proof: In the good state if there is one kind of capital, then, since rg b > , the next
generation should be the only kind produced. On the other hand if the bad state occurs at
time t , then there is no uncertainty about the technology available through period t + M .
Observe that if we produce consumption for period t +t  by producing the old kind of
capital until period t t t ￿ +<+ - Tt 1 then output of consumption at t +t  is
proportional to  br g
Tt Tt T L -- --- 22 which since rg b >  is strictly decreasing in T . This
implies that it is always best to produce the new capital right away. Now consider t the
least integer greater than m*. Since  M m - *1  there is no uncertainty about the
availability of generation  t L -  of the new type of technology to produce consumption for
period t and all subsequent periods. It follows that no capital of the old kind should be
produced beginning in period  t-1 (or of course any later period). Also since  M t >- 1,
it is impossible to produce any capital of a higher kind than the newest kind in period
t-1. Consequently in period  t +1 the only type of capital is the most advanced kind in
that state, giving the desired result.
ª
Suppose now that only the most advanced kind of capital is available, and denote
the most advanced kind of capital in state h  by z() h . Let Vk ss
z s (, )
() h
h be the lifetime
value of future consumption beginning in this state with ks
z s () h  units of the most advanced
capital. Notice that having k
i units of generation i capital will simply result in g
ii k  times
as much consumption in every future time and state as with a single unit of generation 016
capital. If we take Vm to be the value of a single unit of generation 0 capital (of any type)
when mm () h = , we can write
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Notice also for mM >  that VV mM = .
Notice that capital is produced for period t before the state at period t is known,
but is used in period t after the state is determined. Consequently, we can compare the
value of the capital stock (relative to the price of consumption) at time t immediately
before and immediately after the state is realized. Our goal is to show that good news has
a marginal impact on the value of capital, but bad news causes it to change abruptly.
Proposition 4.2: Suppose Mm > - *1  and the initial stock of capital consists solely of the
most advanced kind of capital in state h0 . When -£ < 10 q , news of a negative shock
m() h = 0 causes the value of the capital stock to fall immediately; if q > 0 the value of
the capital stock rises immediately. Precisely, the ratio of the value of the capital stock
after the announcement to that before is given by












From an economic perspective, the interesting case is when time intervals are relatively
short, so that p  is small. Notice, however, that it is not the case that shorter time intervals
lead VV M 0 1 / ￿ : the need to switch to a new technology has an appreciable utility cost
regardless of how time is measured. This means that for short time intervals, to a good17
approximation, good news has little effect on the value of the capital stock, while bad
news causes it to change by VV M 0 / .
Proof: Since the capital stock and current consumption are both fixed, the only question is
what happens to the price of the capital stock.  If in the current period m() h = 0 it must be
that the previous period mM () h > . In addition, by Proposition 4.1 in the current period
there is a single type of capital of the most advanced capital. Suppose that the amount of
this capital is  ks
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The corresponding prices at which capital  ks
z() h  is traded are determined by differentiating
these values with respect to  ks
z() h . Notice that ii gg b b (( ) , ) (( ) , ) w hh w h h = -1 , since the
ability of the capital to produce next period consumption is not changed by the shock.
Consequently the price of capital without the negative shock is proportional to -qVM , and
with the negative shock to -qV0.  Clearly VV M 0 < . If q < 0 this means that
- >- qq VV M 0, while if q > 0 this means that -< - qq VV M 0, which is the desired result.
ª
Proposition 4.2 shows that when time intervals are short, good news has a
marginal impact on stock prices, while bad news causes them to change abruptly. We
reinforce this by showing that once the good state is sufficiently well established,
meaningmM () h ￿ , the value of the capital stock from period to period rises
exponentially, and, in the continuous time limit, continuously.
Proposition 4.3: Suppose Mm > - *1  and the initial stock of capital consists solely of the











































Proof: Observe that since mM s () h ￿ , the economy is following balanced growth, and in
particular the relative price of capital to consumption is not changing. So the growth in the










































() h ,i ss (( ) , ) wh h -- = 11 0. Then the Bellman equation
is
Vu V V MM = +- -+
- df r g fp p f
q max ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 0 16 1 6 .
The first order condition for the optimum is
fq r g f p p
qq q -- - --
+ -- + 
 
 =
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Substituting back into the first order condition, we find



















which is the desired result.
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4.2. Dynamic Analysis
We now examine in greater detail the time path of consumption and capital
following a negative shock. Without loss of generality we may begin at time 0 in state h0 ,
assuming that a negative shock has just occurred. We may also assume that there is only
one kind capital, that this is type 0 generation 0, and that there is 1 unit of this capital, as
well as c0 units of characteristic produced from last period. We also assume that current
capital is the most advanced possible given the technology, so the initial state has
w h () 0 1 = , i(, ) 00 0 h = , iL (, ) 11 0 h =- -  and m() h0 0 = .
In this analysis it is convenient to take  M  to be the largest integer smaller than
m*. This means that as soon as the economy switches from two kinds of capital to one, it
is possible to have negative shocks once again. This simplifies computations without
detracting a great deal from the economics.
Suppose that 0 <￿ tM . Notice that during this period, only the old kind of capital
is used to produce consumption, and so from the zero profit condition the market discount
factor from period t to period t +1 is  pp tt +
- = 1
1 / b . In the interior the household must be






















1 db q 1 6  .
During this period the new type of capital will grow at the rate r , as it is not used to
produce consumption. We summarize this information in the table below.20
t ct kt
00 kt




































We can also work out the amount of old capital required for 0 <￿ tM :
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Finally, observe that initial capital can be used either to produce period 1 consumption,
yielding a marginal lifetime utility of duc ’( ) 1 , or to produce period  M +1 type 1 capital of
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Next we must calculate lifetime utility beginning in the negative state.
 (3) Vc k V
M







































Notice also that in the good state, the fraction of the capital stock devoted to consumption
f  must be constant. Consequently one unit of capital in the good state will produce fg
i
units of the characteristic and () 1-fr  units of the next generation of capital. This leads to
the Bellman equation
Vu V V MM = +- - + -
-- df p g r f p r f f
qq max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 11 10 1616
The first order condition determining f  is
f qgr p gr f qrp r f
q qq -- -- -- + -- + - =
1 11
0 11 1 0 () () () 16 16 VV M ,
or
(4) f








1 () 16 49 VV M
while the Bellman equation for this value of f  gives
VV V MM = -+ - - + -
-- - - -- dq f d f p gr d f pr
qq q qq 1
0 11 1 () () () 16 .























0 ,, , ,
() - f .  By
directly substituting (1) into (2) and (3); (3) into (4) and (5), and (4) into (5) this may be
reduced to two equations in the unknowns cV M 1, .22
4.3. Quantitative Aspects of the Theory
To get a handle on the implications of the theory, it is useful to consider the
extreme case in which bad shocks are rare, so that p ￿ 0, and in which new technologies
are difficult to get on line, so that  L ￿￿. This will result (for given values of the other
parameters) in the most extreme stock market fall.
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Let g denote the growth rate of consumption (in the good state); then  g = - grf () 1  and
we may substitute in the expression for 1-f  to find grd
q =
+ g
1 / .  This gives the value of

























For the case where L is large, once the technology plays out, the time it takes for a
new kind of capital to come on line is excessively long. So we can regard the bad state as
similar to the good state, but with a potential growth rate of consumption of b rather than
gr. If we let  gb  denote the essentially fixed growth rate of consumption in this state, we









































Notice that as the logarithmic case is approached, so q ￿ 0, that VV M 0 1 / ￿  as
asserted by Proposition 4.1. Notice, however, that it is also the case that as q ￿- 1 (so23
the utility function approaches linearity) VV M 0 1 / ￿ . So it is the intermediate range
between the logarithm and linear utility functions that is of interest.
Notice from  d
q =
+ g
1 /  that the market rate of interest is d
q / g
+1 in the good
state and similarly it is d
q / gb
+1 in the bad state. To explore more carefully, let us suppose
that  gb =1 so that there is no growth following a negative shock. In this case the market
rate of interest in the bad state is simply the subjective discount factor. First take this to be
5%, so that d = 095 . . If the rate of growth of consumption in the good state is 5%, we
may calculate the variations in the market value of the stock of capital caused by the bad
shock for different levels of risk aversion. This is reported in the next table, along with the
interest rate in the good and bad states.
q -.1 -.2 -.4 -.8
1 0 -VV M / 6.8% 9.9% 9.6% 1.4%
Interest at M 9.1% 8.6% 7.7% 5.9%
Interest at 0 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Notice that the size of the market drop in the intermediate range of q  is not terribly
sensitive to the value of q . In this range the market drops roughly 10% in response to bad
news. If consider a more drastic fall in the rate of consumption growth from 10% to 0%,
we find
q -.1 -.2 -.4 -.8
1 0 -VV M / 13.4% 19.8% 19.7% 2.9%
Interest at M 12.8% 12.0% 10.3% 6.8%
Interest at 0 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Here, the market drops on the order of 20%.24
However, in these examples, the market interest rate in the bad state is 5%, which
is high by historical standards. If we reanalyze a change from 5% to 0% growth with
d =.98 we find
-.1 -.2 -.4 -.8
1 0 -VV M / 17.8% 26.4% 27.8% 2.9%
Interest at M 6.2% 5.8% 4.8% 4.4%
Interest at 0 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 3.0%
meaning a nearly 30% drop in the market. The reason that greater patience leads to a
more significant market fall, is because the bad shock has no consequence for next period
consumption, but the difference in future production possibilities grows over time.
While we cannot pretend that the present, simplified model provides a realistic
account of observed movements in stock market prices, it is still worthwhile assessing the
extent to which it is roughly consistent with the historical evidence. To this end, we first
consider the quality of our simple approximation and then present the results of a
simulation of the model for parameter values that are not altogether impossible.
We have not tried to calibrate our model to available U.S. data, as our framework
does not incorporate an explicit labor supply rule, nor does it contain other sources of
shocks beyond the “large,” and infrequent shocks provoked by major technological
changes. During the majority of periods in which the existing technology is being
improved, there are no other shocks in our model and both quantities and prices follow a
deterministic path. Real economies are affected by many other, smaller but more frequent
shocks, that lead to large fluctuations in hours worked, quantities produced and market
prices.
Further, we are using a very aggregate model in which only two types of capital
are in use at each moment of time. It is hard to imagine that we can approximate real
market fluctuations terribly well with a model in which there is a single sector of
production and a single technology which is occasionally dismissed to be replaced with a25
new one. A more realistic model would require several capital sectors, each with its own
technology shocks, and a more elaborate technology for the production of the final
consumption good involving various kinds of capital as well as labor. This would, of
course, require an explicit analysis of the flow of resources between sectors in response to
shocks, as well as an explicit evaluation of the degree of substitutability among inputs in
the various sectors. This is a very interesting task which, nevertheless, goes beyond the
scope of the present, theoretical, paper and is left to a future investigation.
To check the quality of the approximation consider the case of d = 095 . ,
q = -.4 and a rate of growth of consumption in the good state of 5%.  For comparison,
we consider p b r g == = == = 005 12 20 1052 105 1032 ., , , . , ., . ML . The growth rate in the
bad state is ill defined, so we take  gb =
+ ()
/( ) db
q 11 , which is correct asymptotically. Both
sets of results are shown in the table below.
approximation exact
1 0 -VV M / 9.6% 9.0%
g 5.0% 5.0%
gb 0.0% 0.0%
Notice the relatively small reduction in the size of the stock market drop, due to the fewer
number of periods required to get back to the level of efficiency of the previous
technology. (Here L = 20, as opposed to  L = ￿  in the approximation.) Similar results can
be obtained with other sets of more or less “credible” parameter values. In particular, we
have looked at various configurations of parameter values that are consistent with the
choice of a quarter as the unit of time. In this case, for discount factors in the range
[. ,. ] 98 99  and choices of  b gr ,,  and  M  yielding growth rates of consumption
g‡[. ,. ] 101103  and  gb ‡[.,. ] 10102  we obtain drops in the stock market index that range
between 3 and 9 percent over the quarter after the bad news is received.
Finally we have simulated the time paths of aggregate quantities generated by our
model over extended periods of time to get an idea of their business cycle properties. The26
figure below reports the time paths of the stock of capital and the flow of consumption
generated by a simulation calibrated using the parameters from the last table. Over the
time period considered we observe the introduction and consecutive replacement of three
different types of capital stocks. The overall pattern is clear and qualitatively acceptable.
Accumulation occurs slowly while dismissal is fast and in the initial period, abrupt.
Observe that when the bad news arrives the process of accumulation stops for a while.
During this period only replacement of machines takes place: the old type of capital is
used only to produce consumption while the new kind of machines are accumulated and
the sum of the two stocks remains constant from one period to the next. At the end of the
replacement period the stock of new machines is equal to the stock of old machines when
the recession began, after which net accumulation of capital resumes again. The path of
consumption follows along. As predicted, consumption recessions starts at the time at
which the old technology cannot be improved any further and continue after that for a
relatively long number of periods, while the new capital good is improved and
accumulated.27
One can distinguish the consumption recession periods, in which there is no
growth, and the good periods of high growth beginning when the replacement of the old
technology is completed. The cyclical growth pattern of aggregate output can easily be
inferred from the separate behavior of  ct  and  kt  by recalling that, in the practice of
National Income Accounting, output is computed by normalizing relative prices in a base
year. In our case, we can, for example, use the relative price of capital at the beginning of
the recession period to compute net aggregate output as the sum of the consumption flow
plus the net investment flow. The latter is zero during the transition, therefore output
growth would be also nil during this period. When recovery begins, output of the
investment good becomes positive and consumption growth resumes, hence aggregate
output growth would increase sharply and converge toward its balanced growth level until
the next recession strikes. If, contrary to National Income Accounting practices, one takes
into account the changes in the relative prices of capital goods, output growth would be
slightly positive even during the recession periods but still much lower than during the
periods of high growth and persistent oscillations in growth rates would still appear.
Capital Stock
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Stock market crashes occur at the beginning of recessions and continue for a while
after. Notice that, because of the change in the relative price of capital we just mentioned,
stock market valuations begin to recover before consumption growth does. Hence stock
market values are good predictors of subsequent movements in total output growth.
5. Conclusions
We have constructed a model of long-run growth due to major technological
innovations, improvement of existing machines and substitution away from old
technologies toward new ones when the former cannot be improved any further. Our
theoretical model predicts, in a stylized fashion, that the following sequence of events
should be observed.
When an old mode of production (technology) cannot be improved further it is
dismissed and progressively replaced by a newer one, which allows for additional periods
of productivity gains and balanced growth. The dismissal of the old technology and the
introduction of new machines trigger recessions. They continue for a few periods while
the new technology is being developed, but end before development of the new machines
is completed. Recoveries settle in slowly and correspond to the phase in which the new
capital good is being adopted and improved to its maximum productivity potential. After
the initial period, recoveries accelerate, leading to a phase of balanced growth that lasts
until the next innovation takes place. Hence, recessions are shorter than recoveries but
more abrupt. The growth rates of aggregate output persistently oscillate around a kind of
average balanced growth rate. As in other models of growth and innovation, such as that
of Aghion and Howitt [1], recessions are a consequence of the adoption of new
technologies. Contrary to those models, recessions are not due to the fact that labor
invested in R&D does not contribute to aggregate output. They are instead, due to the
sudden drop in the ouptut of the investment good and to the reduction in the growth rate
of the consumption sector. We find this characterization more in line with what is
currently known about business cycles and growth.
The behavior of stock market prices predicted by our model is rather interesting
and seems to correspond, qualitatively and quantitatively, to patterns that can be observed
in long-run data. Sizeable stock market crashes occur from time to time: they are larger in29
magnitude than booms, but less frequent and last for fewer periods. The stock market
index grows somewhat smoothly for many periods and then collapses for a few ones. Our
quantitative exercise shows that, for reasonable parameter values, the size of the stock
market crashes may be as high as 30% and as low as 4 or 5%. These large and sudden
crashes which follow periods of regular growth, are due to fundamental economic factors
and not to market inefficiencies or investors’ irrational behavior.30
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Appendix: Stock Market Data
For the years 1889-1984, the table below reports the S&P 500 index divided by GNP
deflator, and the deviation from the mean of the difference between the log of this value
and that of the subsequent year. The data are from Shiller [17]
Year S&P Growth
1889 0.27 3.0%
1890 0.28 -8.6%
1891 0.26 14.0%
1892 0.30 0.1%
1893 0.31 -21.3%
1894 0.25 -0.8%
1895 0.25 3.6%
1896 0.26 -3.4%
1897 0.26 11.8%
1898 0.29 19.0%
1899 0.36 -5.4%
1900 0.34 15.3%
1901 0.40 8.1%
1902 0.44 3.5%
1903 0.46 -27.1%
1904 0.36 20.7%
1905 0.44 13.9%
1906 0.51 -8.8%
1907 0.47 -34.6%
1908 0.34 23.4%
1909 0.43 7.9%
1910 0.47 -8.9%
1911 0.44 -7.2%
1912 0.41 1.5%
1913 0.42 -13.2%
1914 0.37 -15.6%
1915 0.32 9.4%
1916 0.36 -20.7%
1917 0.29 -42.7%
1918 0.19 7.7%
1919 0.21 -0.2%
1920 0.21 -8.0%
1921 0.20 6.0%
1922 0.21 16.4%
1923 0.25 -0.9%
1924 0.25 14.6%
1925 0.30 15.6%
1926 0.35 8.0%
1927 0.38 24.9%
1928 0.50 34.7%
1929 0.71 -12.2%
1930 0.63 -21.6%
1931 0.52 -55.0%
1932 0.30 -12.5%
1933 0.27 31.0%
1934 0.37 -16.6%
1935 0.32 37.6%
1936 0.46 20.0%
1937 0.57 -43.4%
1938 0.37 9.8%
1939 0.42 -3.7%
1940 0.41 -23.1%
1941 0.33 -28.9%
1942 0.25 2.2%
1943 0.25 9.6%
1944 0.28 8.4%
1945 0.31 21.3%33
1946 0.39 -27.9%
1947 0.30 -9.3%
1948 0.27 3.2%
1949 0.28 7.0%
1950 0.31 12.8%
1951 0.35 10.6%
1952 0.40 4.6%
1953 0.42 -5.7%
1954 0.40 31.8%
1955 0.56 18.5%
1956 0.68 -1.3%
1957 0.68 -13.6%
1958 0.60 27.7%
1959 0.79 1.1%
1960 0.81 0.6%
1961 0.82 12.1%
1962 0.94 -8.5%
1963 0.87 13.5%
1964 1.00 8.7%
1965 1.11 3.5%
1966 1.16 -13.6%
1967 1.02 6.6%
1968 1.10 1.5%
1969 1.13 -17.6%
1970 0.96 -2.5%
1971 0.94 5.0%
1972 1.00 6.2%
1973 1.07 -32.0%
1974 0.79 -36.8%
1975 0.55 22.4%
1976 0.70 -0.2%
1977 0.70 -22.0%
1978 0.57 0.3%
1979 0.58 -0.2%
1980 0.58 8.9%
1981 0.64 -19.0%
1982 0.54 15.6%
1983 0.63 9.5%
1984 0.70